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Constructive Criticism: Phillips v. AWH Corp. and 
the Continuing Ambiguity of Patent Claim 
Construction Principles∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided 
to rehear Phillips v. AWH Corp.1 en banc to reconcile its intracircuit split, 
clarify the proper principles of claim construction in a patent 
infringement or invalidity lawsuit, and provide litigants with some level 
of predictability in the appeals process.2  In anticipation of this decision, 
numerous commentators hypothesized, advocated, and opined about how 
the Federal Circuit would or should settle the law of claim construction.3  
Although few agreed on a particular solution, nearly everyone agreed 
that one was needed to alleviate the instability and uncertainty plaguing 
the federal appellate process for claim construction appeals, and most 
were optimistic that the Federal Circuit’s decision in Phillips would 
provide the answer.4 
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 1. 363 F.3d 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated, 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004), rev’d, 415 F.3d 
1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1332 (2006). 
 2. John Josef Molenda, Understanding the Federal Circuit’s Internal Debate and Its Decision 
to Rehear Phillips v. AWH Corp. En Banc, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 911, 929 (2004); 
Jessica C. Kaiser, Note, What’s That Mean? A Proposed Claim Construction Methodology for 
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1009, 1010 (2005). 
 3. See, e.g., Jennifer R. Johnson, Out of Context: Texas Digital, The Indefiniteness of 
Language, and the Search for Ordinary Meaning, 44 IDEA 521, 542 (2003–2004) (concluding that 
the Federal Circuit should “recognize the elusiveness of ordinary meaning and return to the 
established line of claim construction precedent”); Daniel S. Matthews, Recent Development, 
Baffled: Phillips v. AWH Corp. and the Reexamination of Dictionary Use in Patent Claim 
Interpretation, 6 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 153, 163 (2004) (concluding that the Federal Circuit should 
“redirect the focus [of claim instruction] to the patent’s specification and intensive evidence”); 
Kaiser, supra note 2, at 1010 (arguing for a “bright-line rule that first looks to dictionaries to provide 
the ordinary meaning of terms contained in patent claims”). 
 4. See SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1347 
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (Dyk, J., concurring) (“The problem is that our decisions provide inadequate 
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Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit’s Phillips opinion failed to 
reconcile its intracircuit split, and in a disillusioning analysis, the en banc 
court blurred the lines between two competing claim construction 
authorities without providing any firm guidance to the district courts on 
how a judge should approach claim construction.  The law of claim 
construction prior to Phillips failed to provide the desired uniformity and 
predictability mandated by the Supreme Court of the United States in 
1996 in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman II).5  In 
Phillips, however, the Federal Circuit saw no need to revise its previous 
claim construction decisions and merely restated a variation of the same 
principles it believed it had been applying all along.6  Moreover, the 
Federal Circuit ultimately applied the same basic principles of claim 
construction to the Phillips patent as the now-vacated panel and district 
court decisions below, yet reached a different conclusion as to the 
definition of the disputed term and accordingly reversed the lower 
court’s judgment of noninfringement. 
Despite the Federal Circuit’s intentions in Phillips, the law of claim 
construction remains just as ambiguous, uncertain, and subject to 
reversal as before.  The Phillips opinion exemplifies the inherent flaws in 
the law of claim construction created by the Federal Circuit’s numerous 
en banc and panel opinions since its landmark decision in Markman v. 
Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman I).7  In addition, the Federal 
                                                                                                                                  
guidance as to when it is appropriate to look to the specification to narrow the claim by 
interpretation and when it is not appropriate to do so.  Until we provide better guidance, I fear that 
the lower courts and litigants will remain confused.”); see also Karen Hagberg & Marc J. Pernick, 
Outside Counsel: ‘Phillips’: Resolving (Most) Issues on Construing Patent Claims, 234 N.Y.L.J. 4, 4 
(2005) (“The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s recent en banc decision in 
Phillips v. AWH Corp. was one of the most eagerly anticipated in its history.”) (citations omitted); 
Douglas McCollam, Patently Offensive?, THE DEAL, Mar. 1, 2004, at 27, available at 2004 WLNR 
17771947 (“It’s a truism within the appellate bar that the outcome of your appeal usually has a lot 
more to do with who’s on your panel than what’s in your brief.”).  University of Pennsylvania Law 
Professor R. Polk Wagner even has a calculator that can tell you how your case will come out 
depending upon the names of the judges on your panel.  Claim Construction.com, The Claim 
Construction Project (Nov. 1, 2002), http://predictor.claimconstruction.com.  See generally Jay 
Dratler, Jr., Alice in Wonderland Meets the U.S. Patent System, 38 AKRON L. REV. 299 (2005) 
(criticizing the current system). 
 5. 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996).  According to the Supreme Court in Markman II, this desired 
uniformity and predictability was precisely the reason it decided that claim construction was an issue 
of law.  See David B. Pieper, The Appropriate Judicial Actor for Patent Interpretation: A 
Commentary on the Supreme Court’s Decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 51 ARK. 
L. REV. 159, 176–79 (1998) (criticizing the Markman decision).  Between 1998 to 2000 the Federal 
Circuit reversed approximately one-third of the claim construction cases heard on appeal.  Christian 
A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1075, 1142 (2001). 
 6. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1332 
(2006). 
 7. 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
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Circuit’s continued adherence to Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.,8 
by reviewing the district court’s claim construction rulings entirely de 
novo, only increases the ambiguity of the appeals process in a patent 
infringement or invalidity lawsuit. 
The problem with a de novo standard of review, in the context of 
claim construction, is that even if a district court applies the correct claim 
construction principles, the Federal Circuit remains free to analyze the 
claims anew without any deference to the lower court’s findings.  This 
practice may result in the term ultimately being defined more accurately.  
However, it also created enormous unpredictability for litigants because 
the Federal Circuit is not bound to merely accept or reject the lower 
court’s claim construction, but can generate an entirely new definition 
for the disputed term.9  Overruling Cybor, and redesignating claim 
construction as an issue of fact or at least subject to some degree of 
deference, has been the most popular solution offered to ease this 
unpredictability.10  In fact, this is the position taken by AWH 
Corporation in its petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court 
after its judgment of noninfringement was reversed by the Federal 
Circuit in Phillips.11  However, even under a deferential standard of 
review, actually determining whether the district court’s claim 
construction is “clearly erroneous” will remain equally unpredictable 
until the Federal Circuit provides clearer guidelines on claim 
construction to the lower courts. 
The least drastic and most practical way to provide uniformity and 
predictability to claim construction without sacrificing accuracy is for the 
Federal Circuit to set forth a distinct rubric of rules, including a specific 
sequence of analysis and consideration of evidence, and then apply these 
                                                     
 8. 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 9. Theoretically, if one applies the correct legal standard, one reaches the correct result and 
accurately defines the term.  Arguably, however, one could apply the correct legal standard, but still 
incorrectly construe the disputed term.  Reviewing appeals for clear error and remanding inaccurate 
claims constructions should sufficiently correct these mistakes, making an entirely de novo review 
excessive. 
 10. See, e.g., William H. Burgess, Simplicity at the Cost of Clarity: Appellate Review of Claim 
Construction and the Failed Promise of Cybor, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 763, 764 (2004); Lawrence M. 
Sung, Echoes of Scientific Truth in the Halls of Justice: The Standard of Review Applied by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Patent-Related Matters, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 
1233, 1277–78 (1999); Chelsea McGinity Bonini, Note, Claim Construction Must Be Reexamined—
As a Matter of Fact, Pitney Bowes Undermines Markman, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 477, 
483–87 (2001).  Several amicus curiae briefs called for some deference.  See infra note 266 (listing 
groups that advocated for deference). 
 11. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12–21, AWH Corp. v. Phillips, 126 S. Ct. 1332 (2006) 
(No. 05-602).  The Supreme Court denied AWH’s petition on February 21, 2006.  AWH Corp., 126 
S. Ct. at 1332. 
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rules consistently in its own opinions.  The Federal Circuit must limit the 
flexibility of district court judges and of itself in construing claims—
regardless of whether it decides to revisit Cybor.  Further, those Federal 
Circuit judges who disagree with the current standard of review and 
fact/law distinction—and who can typically be counted on to dissent—
must also agree to follow precedent in their respective panel decisions, 
and address their differences on these issues separately from the task of 
construing disputed claim terms.12  Otherwise, litigants and their 
attorneys can never hope to have the predictability and certainty the 
Supreme Court sought to provide in Markman II.13 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. General Principles of Patent Law14 
The United States Constitution vests in Congress the authority “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”15  The constitutional purpose for granting 
patents is to encourage innovation by protecting the rights of inventors 
while ultimately increasing the public storehouse of knowledge.16  A 
patent grants the patentee the exclusive “right to exclude others from 
making, using, offering for sale, [selling], . . . or importing” a patented 
invention in the United States during the patent term.17  In exchange for 
this limited monopoly, inventors are required to provide a full disclosure 
of the invention: 
                                                     
 12. Circuit Judges Newman and Mayer have strongly and consistently opposed de novo review, 
and the classification of claim construction as purely a matter of law, since Markman I.  E.g., 
Serrano v. Telular Corp., 111 F.3d 1578, 1586 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Mayer, J., concurring) (noting that 
the court of appeals should give deference to the trial court’s factual findings in claim interpretation 
where material facts are disputed). 
 13. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s mandate of uniformity and 
predictability). 
 14. For further background reading on patent law, see DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES 
OF PATENT LAW 72–115 (3d ed. 2004). 
 15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  Congress has prescribed specific rules and guidelines 
regarding the requirements for obtaining a U.S. patent.  35 U.S.C. §§ 100–250 (2000).  Title 37 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations also prescribes rules for patent drafting and prosecution.  37 C.F.R. 
§§ 1.01–.997 (2005). 
 16. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
AGE 119 (3d ed. 2003) (explaining the central theory behind patent law). 
 17. 35 U.S.C. § 154.  The patent term is twenty years from the filing date of the utility 
application or from the filing date of an earlier-filed utility application to which the patent at issue 
claims priority.  Id. § 154(a)(2). 
COOK_FINAL.DOC 1/12/2007  2:59:42 PM 
2006]  CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM 229 
The [patent] specification shall contain a written description of the 
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in 
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled 
in the art18 . . . to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best 
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.  The 
[patent] shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing 
out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant 
regards as his invention.19 
The claims of a patent describe the metes and bounds of a patentee’s 
right to exclude others from making, using, offering to sell, selling, or 
importing a patented invention within the United States.20  In general, the 
patent claims broadly define the claimed invention, whereas the patent 
specification sets forth the invention in more exacting terms.21  This is 
because the specification must include a detailed description and set forth 
the “best mode” of the invention, whereas the patent claims often employ 
broad, open-ended language and “may vary in scope or method of 
description or expression” as long as they are supported by the 
specification.22  However, the scope of a patentee’s rights are defined by 
the scope of the broadest claims and not by the scope of the specification.  
Thus, patent drafters generally write claims in a reverse pyramid fashion 
with the first claim being in independent form (i.e., self-contained) and 
broadest in scope and subsequent claims depending from this claim and 
becoming increasingly narrower in scope.  These subsequent dependent 
claims refer back to and incorporate by reference the subject matter of 
the independent claim, while adding further limitations to the scope of 
that independent claim.23  From the broadest to the most particularized 
                                                     
 18. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (stating that to be patentable an invention must not be “obvious at the 
time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter 
pertains”).  “Person skilled in the art” is a legal fiction, similar to the “reasonable man” concept.  It is 
used in patent law to refer to a hypothetical person considered to have average expertise and 
knowledge with regard to the technical field of a particular invention (also referred to as “persons of 
ordinary skill in the art”).  CHISUM ET AL., supra note 14, at 536 n.25 (citing Giles S. Rich, Laying 
the Ghost of the “Invention” Requirement, in NONOBVIOUSNESS—THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF 
PATENTABILITY 1:508 (John Witherspoon ed., 1980)). 
 19. § 112 (footnote added).  Patentable subject matter must also be novel, id. § 102, and 
nonobvious, id. § 103. 
 20. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).  A common misconception about patents is that they grant the 
patent holder the right to make, use, or sell the patented invention; when in fact, all a patent confers 
is the right to prevent others from doing so.  It is, in essence, a negative right.  CHISUM ET AL., supra 
note 14, at 90. 
 21. See § 112 (explaining the requirements for specifications and claims). 
 22. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 14, at 91. 
 23. § 112 (“A claim may be written in independent or, if the nature of the case admits, in 
dependent or multiple dependent form.  Subject to the following paragraph, a claim in dependent 
form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of 
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and narrow versions of the invention, this practice allows patentees to 
claim their invention in varying capacities and alternative forms in an 
attempt to expand their patent rights as far as legitimately possible.24  
The doctrine of claim differentiation gives rise to the presumption during 
claim construction that a patentee did not intend for broader independent 
claims to contain the limitations added by subsequent dependent 
claims.25  The doctrine thus precludes a court from reading those 
limitations into the independent claims, because doing so would unduly 
limit the scope of those claims and, consequently, the scope of the 
patentee’s invention and rights.26 
In addition to defining the scope of a patentee’s rights, patent claims 
also serve to provide public notice of the scope of these rights and of the 
invention in general.27  However, patents are not directed toward the 
general public, but toward persons of ordinary skill in the relevant 
technical field of the invention.28  Accordingly, the claims must be 
construed from the perspective of those persons of ordinary skill in the 
art and not from the perspective of the public generally.  For example, 
when a court reads a patent, “[a] technical term used in [the patent] is 
interpreted as having the meaning that it would be given by persons 
experienced in the field of the invention.”29  Competing inventors are 
entitled to rely on claim language to anticipate whether a given 
conception or creation will infringe the patented invention and to 
determine the necessary steps to design around the patented invention 
and avoid infringement.30 
                                                                                                                                  
the subject matter claimed.  A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by 
reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers.”).  See infra text accompanying notes 
109–10 for an example of an independent and dependent claim set. 
 24. Under existing law, patentees sometimes play the odds and write intentionally ambiguous 
claims, which increases their scope to capture other embodiments that the patentee did not envision 
at the time of filing 
 25. 5A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.03[6] (2005).  Construing the 
independent claim to include the limitations added by the dependent claim would render the 
dependent claim redundant.  Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. PSC Computer Prods., Inc. v. Foxconn Int’l, Inc., 355 F.3d 1353, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 2004).   
 28. Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 
2004).  Competitors need to know not only what is protected by the claims, but also which aspects of 
the invention have been disclosed, but not claimed, and are thus, considered to have been dedicated 
to the public domain. 
 29. Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems., Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 30. PCS Computer, 355 F.3d at 1359. 
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B. Claim Construction Principles 
1. Claim Construction Analysis 
When a patentee believes that another’s device infringes the patented 
invention, the patentee can sue the alleged infringer in federal district 
court.  Regardless of the district where the patentee files the case, 
however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
generally hears all patent infringement appeals.31  Unless the Federal 
Circuit chooses to hear a case en banc, it hears all appeals in three-judge 
panels.  A patent infringement analysis is a two-step process: (1) 
determining the meaning of the claim terms through a process known as 
claim construction; and (2) comparing the allegedly infringing device, 
method, or composition of matter to the properly construed claims to 
determine whether there is literal infringement or infringement under the 
doctrine of equivalents.32  The “claim construction inquiry . . . begins and 
ends in all cases with the actual words of the claims.”33  Thus, the 
language of the claims determines the scope of a patentee’s right to 
exclude others from infringing his patented invention.34  Claim 
construction is, therefore, a crucial step in patent infringement litigation 
                                                     
 31. In 1982, Congress created the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to hear 
all patent infringement appeals.  Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 
Stat. 25, 38 (1982) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000)); see also MERGES ET AL., 
supra note 16, at 118 (2003) (discussing practical implications of procedural rules).  Related issues 
of subject matter jurisdiction, removal, etc., may result in a patent case being brought in a state court, 
but this Comment leaves that to another discussion. 
 32. Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1247–48 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 33. Id. at 1248; see also Autogiro Co. of America v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 395–401 (Ct. 
Cl. 1967) (further discussing patent law, claim interpretation, and application in an infringement 
opinion). 
 34. PCS Computer, 355 F.3d at 1360; see also Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement 
Co., 365 U.S. 336, 339 (1961) (stating that the “claims made in the patent are the sole measure of the 
grant”); Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (same).  The outcome of many cases has turned on seemingly insignificant language in the 
patent claims.  See, e.g., Kustom Signals, Inc. v. Applied Concepts, Inc., 264 F.3d 1326, 1329–30 
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (infringement turned upon whether the allegedly infringing radar device, which 
searched both magnitude and frequency signals, infringed patentee’s radar device, which searched 
magnitude “or” frequency signals); Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 1300–01 
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (infringement turned upon the meaning of the terms “cover” and “including”); 
Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1251 (infringement turned upon whether the term “when” meant at the time 
of contact or meant at or after the time of contact); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 
1458–59 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (infringement turned upon whether the term “to” required the 
liquid to pass directly from one pump to another or if it could pass through intermediate 
components); Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1430–31 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(infringement turned upon meaning of word “through”); N. Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid 
Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1575–76 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (infringement turned upon whether the word “a” could 
mean more than one or was confined to its traditional singular definition). 
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because the definition of the term at issue will often determine whether 
infringement has occurred.35 
2. Claim Construction Is an Issue of Law That the Federal Circuit 
Reviews De Novo 
In Markman I, the Federal Circuit held that claim construction was a 
matter of law purely within the province of the courts.36  The Supreme 
Court affirmed, in a unanimous opinion, holding that although claim 
construction included a number of factual underpinnings the judge would 
need to consider, a patent is a legal instrument which, for policy reasons, 
should be construed by the judge and not the jury.37  According to the 
Court, 
[p]atent construction in particular “is a special occupation, requiring, 
like all others, special training and practice.  The judge, from his 
training and discipline, is more likely to give a proper interpretation to 
such instruments than a jury . . . .”  [A]ny credibility determinations 
will be subsumed within the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the 
whole document . . . .38 
The Court hoped this would create increased uniformity and 
predictability and strengthen the patent system.39  According to the 
Court, “[t]reating interpretive issues as purely legal will promote . . . 
intrajurisdictional certainty through the application of stare decisis on 
those questions not yet subject to interjurisdictional uniformity under the 
authority of the single appeals court.”40  Many members of the patent bar 
hoped that under this new system clear claim construction principles 
would develop, and district court claim construction inquiries would 
improve, lessening the need for reversal by the Federal Circuit on 
                                                     
 35. In 2005, the Federal Circuit heard 112 patent appeals, of which 38 centered on the issue of 
claim construction.  The next most frequently appealed issue (18 out of 112) was novelty (35 U.S.C. 
§ 102).  LAWRENCE M. SUNG & JEFF E. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW HANDBOOK § 14:4 (2005-2006 
ed.). 
 36. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman I), 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(en banc). 
 37. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman II), 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996) 
(referring to functional considerations of judges, not juries, determining meaning).  It is important to 
note that the Court based its holding on a policy argument only after exhaustively discussing the 
historical and legal aspects of the issue without resolution. 
 38. Id. at 388–89 (quoting Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1140 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849) (No. 
10,740)). 
 39. Id. at 390 (“It was just for the sake of such desirable uniformity that Congress created the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as an exclusive appellate court for patent cases . . . .”). 
 40. Id. at 391. 
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appeal.41  In fact, empirical evidence suggests that the Federal Circuit 
reversal rate did decline after Markman II, but rose again shortly after 
Cybor.42 
The Supreme Court, in Markman II, did not explicitly address the 
issue of standard of review.43  However, in Cybor the Federal Circuit 
decided that it would review a district court’s claim construction 
decisions de novo on appeal, “including any allegedly fact-based 
questions relating to claim construction.”44  Cybor explicitly overruled a 
line of Federal Circuit cases that had recognized the claim construction 
inquiry as a quasi-factual undertaking or as a mixed question of law and 
fact.45  This line of cases held that the district court judge was best 
positioned to make any findings of fact or credibility determinations 
regarding claim construction and, accordingly, deferred to such findings 
or determinations in conducting claim construction analysis on appeal.46  
After Cybor, the Federal Circuit began conducting its own independent 
claim construction inquiries on appeal, regardless of whether the district 
court applied the correct claim construction standard.  Cybor marked the 
beginning of an ever increasing reversal rate of claim construction 
related appeals, which is currently at about thirty percent.47  The Federal 
Circuit’s en banc decision in Phillips exemplifies the perils of de novo 
review and underscores the argument that without clearer claim 
                                                     
 41. Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More 
Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 245–46 (2005). 
 42. Id. at 246. 
 43. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) 
(discussing Markman II). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. E.g., Fromson v. Anitec Printing Plates, Inc., 132 F.3d 1437, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1997); 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1555–56 (Fed. Cir. 1997); 
Wiener v. NEC Elecs., Inc., 102 F.3d 534, 539 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Metaullics Sys. Co. v. Cooper, 100 
F.3d 938, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 47. Moore, supra note 41, at 239.  One reason for this high reversal rate could be that the 
Federal Circuit is more “pro patent” than the lower courts.  In seventy-six percent of the cases 
studied, the alleged infringer won at the district court level, whereas the Federal Circuit favored the 
alleged infringer only fifty-eight percent of the time.  Id. at 240–41.  However, closer inspection 
reveals that the Federal Circuit is just as likely to reverse a case won by the patentee as it is to 
reverse a case won by the alleged infringer.  Id. at 241.  Patent law does have safeguards in place to 
avoid this waste of judicial economy.  A party can request certification of an interlocutory appeal to 
the Federal Circuit on the district judge’s claim construction before proceeding with the rest of the 
trial.  However, the Federal Circuit has yet to grant such a request.  Craig Allen Nard, Process 
Considerations in the Age of Markman and Mantras, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 355, 357 (2001) (“To 
realize early certainty, the Federal Circuit must make a choice—either afford district court claim 
interpretations more deference or grant interlocutory appeals on the issue of claim interpretation.  
The Federal Circuit cannot have it both ways; the court may not exercise de novo review while 
refusing to hear interlocutory appeals.”). 
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construction guidelines from the Federal Circuit, the unpredictability of 
the appeals process will continue to plague the patent system.48 
C. Divergent Case Law—Claim Construction Standards 
Patent infringement often directly or indirectly hinges on the 
meaning of one or more claim terms as understood by a person of 
ordinary skill in the relevant art.49  “Unfortunately, the nature of 
language [often] makes it impossible to capture the essence of a thing in 
a patent application . . . .  The language in the patent claims may not 
capture every nuance of the invention or describe with complete 
precision the range of its novelty.”50  Courts must therefore consult a 
variety of sources, other than the claim language, to understand the 
underlying technology and terminology of the patent’s technical field to 
define the disputed term from the perspective of persons of ordinary skill 
in that field.51  Various types of claim construction cases and conflicting 
decisions by different panels of Federal Circuit judges have resulted in 
divergent claim construction precedent and inconsistent standards for 
lower courts to follow.52 
1. Evidentiary Sources Used in Claim Construction 
One line of authority arose under the Vitronics Corp. v. 
Conceptronic, Inc.53 standard, which looked primarily to intrinsic 
evidence in determining a claim term’s meaning.54  Intrinsic evidence 
includes the patent claims and specification, as well as the prosecution 
history.55  A second line of authority arose under the Texas Digital 
                                                     
 48. See infra Part III.B–D (discussing the rationale behind, and implications of, Phillips). 
 49. See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text (discussing how the meaning of claim terms 
determines the patentee’s ability to sue for patent infringement). 
 50. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002). 
 51. Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 
2004). 
 52. Molenda, supra note 2, at 911; Douglas Y’Barbo, Is Extrinsic Evidence Necessary to 
Resolve: Claim Construction Disputes? Part I, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 687, 727 
(1999). 
 53. 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 54. Id. at 1583. 
 55. Id. at 1582.  The prosecution history is the record of the entire process of obtaining the 
patent, including amendments to the claims, arguments, prior art, and correspondences between the 
patentee and the examiner at the United States Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO).  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 660 (8th ed. 2004). 
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Systems v. Telegenix, Inc.56 standard, which placed special emphasis on 
dictionaries in construing claims.57  Before Texas Digital, the Federal 
Circuit considered dictionaries as part of the extrinsic evidence, which 
includes anything external to the patent file such as expert testimony, 
technical treatises, and articles.58  Texas Digital, however, categorized 
dictionaries as part of the intrinsic evidence for claim construction 
purposes.59 
a. Vitronics and the Intrinsic Evidence Standard 
The Federal Circuit in Vitronics clearly enumerated the procedure to 
be followed in conducting claim construction analysis and set forth a 
clear order for considering evidence.  According to the Vitronics panel, 
the claim construction analysis begins with the words of the claims, 
which “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.”60  
Second, a court should consult the specification to see if the patentee 
explicitly defined the disputed term therein or if the patentee used the 
term in a way that is inconsistent with the ordinary and customary 
meaning.61  A patentee may define a term to mean something other than 
its ordinary and customary definition as long as this special definition is 
clearly set forth in the specification or prosecution history.62  Third, a 
court should look to the prosecution history to see if the patentee 
explicitly defined or disclaimed a given definition for the disputed term 
or used the term in a particular context that sheds light on the intended 
meaning.63  According to the court, patentees often limit the definition 
and scope of a term in order to overcome prior art,64 and courts should 
use such disclaimers to limit the definition of the disputed term 
                                                     
 56. 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 57. Id. at 1202–03. 
 58. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584. 
 59. 308 F.3d at 1203. 
 60. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id.; see also Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebeco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 990 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999) (noting that a patentee may choose to be his own lexicographer). 
 63. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582–83.  Of course, a patentee may also inadvertently limit the 
definition of the term by using it restrictively in the prosecution history.  Id. at 1583. 
 64. “Prior art” is a term used in patent law to designate all publicly disclosed information 
relevant to the patent application in question.  Sources of prior art include prior publications and 
academic articles, prior patents or published applications, and prior general knowledge.  Patents 
commonly serve as prior art for other patent applications.  In order to obtain a patent, a patentee 
must overcome this prior art to satisfy the novelty requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 102.  The invention 
must be novel over what has been patented or otherwise disclosed before.  See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 119 (8th ed. 2004). 
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accordingly in claim construction.65  Courts should also look to the prior 
art cited in the prosecution history for any use of the disputed term.66  
Ultimately, a patentee should generally be held to any intended or 
implied definition expressed in the prosecution history.67 
The patent specification, claims, and prosecution history constitute 
the intrinsic evidence, which, according to the Federal Circuit in 
Vitronics, is the “most significant source of the legally operative 
meaning of disputed claim language.”68  According to the Vitronics 
panel, when the specification appears clear, unambiguous, and enables 
the court to determine the meaning of the disputed term intended by the 
patentee, reliance on extrinsic evidence is improper.69  The intrinsic 
record is also the only information specifically relating to the patent that 
becomes part of the public record and on which competitors are entitled 
to rely to determine the scope of the patent.70  In contrast, extrinsic 
evidence is not part of the public record, and the public notice function of 
patents is ill-served when courts rely on this information in construing 
claims.  For this reason, the Vitronics panel cautioned that courts should 
consult extrinsic evidence only as a last resort and should never use the 
extrinsic evidence to alter the meaning of the disputed term reflected in 
the public record.71  Based upon these principles, the three-judge panel72 
held that the intrinsic evidence in Vitronics was clear and unambiguous, 
and therefore, it was improper for the district court judge to have 
afforded the extrinsic evidence any weight.73  After Vitronics, courts 
applying this standard have relied heavily on the intrinsic evidence when 
construing claims, often to the complete exclusion of extrinsic 
evidence.74 
                                                     
 65. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582–83. 
 66. Id. at 1582. 
 67. Id. at 1582–83. 
 68. Id. at 1582. 
 69. See id. at 1583 (stating that the inquiry should end once the court determines the meaning 
of the disputed term and that it would be illogical to refer to extrinsic evidence at this point). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Federal Circuit Judges Michel and Lourie and Senior Circuit Judge Friedman. 
 73. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1585. 
 74. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. VIA Techs., Inc., 319 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[R]eliance 
on extrinsic evidence was not and is not necessary.”); Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 
339 F. Supp. 2d 202, 247 (D. Mass. 2004) (patent documents are sufficient to construe disputed 
claim terms), vacated on other grounds, 457 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Biagro W. Sales, Inc. v. 
Helena Chem. Co., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1120–21, 1123–28 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (not considering any 
extrinsic evidence). 
COOK_FINAL.DOC 1/12/2007  2:59:42 PM 
2006]  CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM 237 
b. Texas Digital and the “Dictionary First” Approach 
According to the Federal Circuit in Texas Digital, a court should 
approach claim construction with the heavy presumption that disputed 
claim terms carry their ordinary and customary meaning as understood 
from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art.75  Judges are 
generally not persons of ordinary skill in the relevant technical field of 
the patent or related fields.76  Therefore, the Texas Digital panel reasoned 
“that dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises are particularly useful 
resources to assist the court in determining the ordinary and customary 
meanings of claim terms.”77  The three-judge panel78 cited Vitronics for 
the proposition that a court may consult a dictionary at any time during 
the proceeding to determine the meaning of a disputed term as long as 
that meaning does not conflict with the patent documents.79  Indeed, in a 
footnote, the Vitronics court had stated that dictionaries, although part of 
the extrinsic evidence, were “worthy of special note.”80  However, 
contrary to Vitronics, the Texas Digital panel cautioned against 
consulting the intrinsic evidence first and instead recommended that a 
court consult the dictionary as a threshold step in the process of claim 
construction.81  According to the Texas Digital panel, consulting the 
intrinsic evidence first, before attempting to determine the plain meaning 
of the disputed terms, could inadvertently lead to importing limitations 
from the patent specification into the claims and unduly limiting their 
scope—a basic prohibition in patent law.82 
Under Texas Digital, once a court determines the plain meaning of 
the disputed term, it should then consult the intrinsic evidence to: (1) 
                                                     
 75. Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 76. See id. at 1203 (stating that judges need aid in understanding patent technology and 
terminology commonly understood by those involved in the related technical field). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Federal Circuit Judges Michel, Schall, and Linn. 
 79. Tex. Digital, 308 F.3d at 1202 (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 
1584 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).  Considering that the Texas Digital and Vitronics opinions are often 
viewed as being at odds with each other, it is interesting that the Texas Digital panel referenced 
Vitronics as support for its view on dictionaries.  Note also that Federal Circuit Judge Michel sat on 
both panels. 
 80. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584 n.6. 
 81. Tex. Digital, 308 F.3d at 1204–05. 
 82. Id. at 1204 (citing Generation II Orthotics Inc. v. Med. Tech. Inc., 263 F.3d 1356, 1367 
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The district court should have construed the claim limitation ‘controlled’ 
according to its ordinary and accustomed meaning [as defined in a medical dictionary], rather than 
importing a characteristic of a disclosed or preferred embodiment into that term.”); Loctite Corp. v. 
Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 867 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Generally, particular limitations or 
embodiments appearing in the specification will not be read into the claims.”)). 
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identify which of the different possible dictionary definitions is most 
appropriate; (2) determine if all of the given definitions could be 
attributed to the disputed term and thus expand the scope of the 
definition; or (3) see if anything therein rebuts the heavy presumption in 
favor of this ordinary and customary definition.83 
The Texas Digital panel further opined that courts should not label 
dictionaries as part of the extrinsic evidence because they are publicly 
available to aid in interpretation at the time the patent issues, are 
therefore part of the public record, and thus do not undermine the public 
notice function of patents.84  Accordingly, the panel reasoned, a judge 
should be able to consult a dictionary, encyclopedia, or technical treatise 
at any time while conducting a claim construction inquiry, regardless of 
whether the parties have offered such resources into evidence.85  Further, 
the panel observed that, unlike other resources, dictionaries, 
encyclopedias, and treatises “are unbiased reflections of common 
understanding not influenced by expert testimony or events subsequent 
to the fixing of the intrinsic record by the grant of the patent, not colored 
by the motives of the parties, and not inspired by litigation.”86  Courts, 
applying this standard, including other Federal Circuit panels, adopted 
what has been coined the “dictionary first” approach and relied heavily 
on dictionaries, encyclopedias, and similar sources to define disputed 
claim terms.87 
2. Post-Vitronics and Texas Digital: Dictionary or Specification First? 
Cases arising after Texas Digital and Vitronics have struggled with 
these dual standards.  The district courts and the Federal Circuit itself 
have attempted to reconcile or clarify the methodologies espoused by the 
                                                     
 83. Id. at 1203–04.  For example, the inventor may have expressly defined the term or 
disclaimed the plain meaning. 
 84. Id. at 1202–03. 
 85. Id. at 1203. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See generally Kumar v. Ovonic Battery Co., 351 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (using a 
dictionary as a starting point before consulting intrinsic evidence); Inline Connection Corp. v. AOL 
Time Warner, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 307 (D. Del. 2004) (same); Inverness Med. Switz. GmbH v. 
Acon Labs., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 227 (D. Mass. 2004) (same); AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 
01 Civ. 4872(WHP), 2003 WL 21459573 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2003) (same), aff’d, 414 F.3d 1366 
(Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 1901 (2006); Gleason Works v. Oerlikon Geartec AG, 238 
F. Supp. 2d 504 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) (same).  “[B]y 2002 the Federal Circuit was issuing, on average, 
more than two claim construction decisions a month that relied on dictionaries and similar sources to 
construe claim terms.”  Joseph Scott Miller & James A. Hilsenteger, The Proven Key: Roles and 
Rules for Dictionaries at the Patent Office and the Courts, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 829, 908 (2005). 
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Federal Circuit panel decisions in Texas Digital and Vitronics.88  
However, in many cases, the courts have ultimately misinterpreted and 
misapplied either or both of these claim construction standards.  For 
example, in a panel decision case decided before Texas Digital, but after 
Vitronics, the Federal Circuit determined that “Vitronics [did] not 
prohibit courts from examining extrinsic evidence, even when the patent 
document itself is clear.”89  However, an examination of the court’s 
opinion reveals that Vitronics did in fact prohibit courts from examining 
extrinsic evidence when the patent document is clear.90  Specifically, the 
Vitronics court stated “where the public record [i.e., the intrinsic 
evidence] unambiguously describes the scope of the patented invention, 
reliance on any extrinsic evidence is improper.”91  How can the Federal 
Circuit expect lower courts to consistently construe claims when the 
Federal Circuit judges themselves misinterpret and misapply their own 
claim construction precedent? 92 
In theory, if the Federal Circuit was providing adequate guidance, 
claim construction at the district court level should have improved 
significantly in the ten years since Markman II, and the rate of reversal 
on appeal should be decreasing.  However, this is not the case.  Since 
Markman II and Cybor, the Federal Circuit can agree neither on the 
standard to be applied nor on the standard it believes it has been applying 
all along.93  It has failed to provide adequate claim construction guidance 
to lower courts, and more importantly, it has failed to meet the mandate 
of uniformity and predictability set forth by the Supreme Court in 
Markman II.94  The problem lies partly in the fact that the Federal Circuit 
judges seem to disagree amongst themselves on the appropriate claim 
                                                     
 88. See, e.g., Genzyme Corp. v. Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 346 F.3d 1094, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (Linn, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority’s treatment of dictionary definition); Winn 
Inc. v. Eaton Corp., 272 F. Supp. 2d 968, 976 n.4 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (“[T]he Federal Circuit has 
offered inconsistent guidance on this question in several recent opinions.”); Tenneco Packaging 
Specialty & Consumer Prods., Inc. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., No. 98-C-2679, 1999 WL 1044840, 
at *2 n.1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 1999) (“The Federal Circuit’s cases are not entirely clear on whether 
dictionary definitions constitute extrinsic evidence.”). 
 89. Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  The 
case was argued before Federal Circuit Judges Michel, Plager, and Rader. 
 90. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 91. Id. 
 92. See supra text accompanying notes 88–91. 
 93. See discussion supra notes 53–87 and accompanying text (discussing different approaches 
used by the Federal Circuit). 
 94. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman II), 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) 
(“[W]e see the importance of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent as an independent reason 
to allocate all issues of construction to the court.”); see also discussion supra notes 39–41 and 
accompanying text (discussing the intrajurisdictional uniformity that the Markman II court sought to 
create). 
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construction principles.  Whatever the reason, the Federal Circuit 
decided to rehear Phillips in an attempt to reconcile its case law and 
provide district courts, litigants, and the patent bar with clear guidelines 
for construing claims, so that the patent system could finally achieve the 
desired uniformity, predictability, and certainty. 
D. Events Leading to Phillips v. AWH Corp. Patent Infringement Suit 
1. U.S. Patent 4,677,798—Steel Shell Modules for Prisoner Detention 
Facilities 
Edward Phillips invented interchangeable steel modular panels that 
can be easily welded together to create extra detention areas for jails or 
other similar facilities when the main facility overflows with occupants.95  
These modules consist of inner and outer steel walls and provide the 
needed load bearing and structural support to withstand jailbreak efforts, 
vandalism, riot, fire, impact, explosion, or gunfire.96  “Internally 
directed” steel baffles are positioned between the inner and outer walls to 
increase the module’s strength and provide the requisite impact 
resistance (i.e., bullet-deflecting capabilities).97  On July 7, 1987, the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) granted Phillips a 
patent for his invention, which is embodied in U.S. Patent No. 
4,677,798.98 
The alleged infringer, AWH Corporation, had previously marketed 
and sold the patented invention under an express agreement between 
AWH and Phillips.99  After the agreement ended, Phillips alleged that 
AWH continued to use the patented invention without his consent.100  
Infringement in this case ultimately centered on the meaning of the term 
“baffle” in the patent claims and, in particular, the angle of orientation of 
the baffles relative to the steel walls as required by the patent.101  For 
example, if the patent claim required the baffles to be disposed at angles 
other than ninety degrees, then AWH’s modules did not infringe the 
                                                     
 95. U.S. Patent No. 4,677,798 col.1 ll.6–16, 65–67 (filed April 14, 1986), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov (under Patents, click “search”; then follow the hyperlink for “Patent Number 
Search”; then enter the patent number in the box). 
 96. Id. at col.1 ll.65–68, col.2 ll.1–10, 23–30. 
 97. Id. at col.2 ll.11–22. 
 98. Id. at [11], [45]. 
 99. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 363 F.3d 1207, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated, 376 F.3d 1382 
(Fed. Cir. 2004), rev’d, 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1332 (2006). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1209, 1211–12. 
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patent.102  However, if the baffles could be disposed at all angles 
including ninety degrees, then AWH’s modules were infringing 
Phillips’s patent.103 
The description of the invention in the patent does not contain any 
references to baffles disposed at ninety-degree angles, and all references 
to baffle angles refer to either acute or obtuse angles.104  In particular, the 
patent describes baffles that are specifically disposed at angles necessary 
to deflect bullets.105  As a matter of physics, only baffles disposed at 
angles other than ninety degrees are capable of deflecting bullets, as 
bullets or other projectiles could easily go between baffles perpendicular 
to the wall face.106  Therefore, on first impression, the specification 
seems to require baffles disposed at angles other than ninety degrees.  
However, there is no such limitation in the language of claim 1, the 
broadest claim, which requires only that the baffles extend inwardly from 
either wall.107  In fact, claim 1 does not refer to baffle angles at all.108  It 
reads: 
Building modules adapted to fit together for construction of fire, sound 
and impact resistant security barriers and rooms for use in securing 
records and persons, comprising in combination, an outer shell of 
substantially parallelepiped shaped with two outer steel plate panel 
sections of greater surface area serving as inner and outer walls for a 
structure when a plurality of the modules are fitted together, sealant 
means spacing the two panel sections from steel to steel contact with 
each other by a thermal-acoustical barrier material, and further means 
disposed inside the shell for increasing its load bearing capacity 
comprising internal steel baffles extending inwardly from the steel shell 
walls.109 
Claim 2 contains the first mention of a requirement for baffle angles: 
“Modules as defined in claim 1 wherein the steel baffles are oriented 
with the panel sections disposed at angles for deflecting projectiles such 
as bullets able to penetrate the steel plates.”110 
                                                     
 102. Id. at 1213–14. 
 103. Id. 
 104. ‘798 Patent at col.2 ll.11–15. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Phillips, 363 F.3d at 1213 (“Baffles directed at [ninety degrees] cannot deflect 
projectiles as described in the ‘798 patent . . . .”). 
 107. ‘798 Patent at col.6 ll.22–34. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. (emphasis added). 
 110. Id. at col.6 ll.35–38 (emphasis added). 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. Phillips Sues AWH Corporation For Patent Infringement 
1. District Court Proceedings 
The district court judge had to determine whether the “baffles” 
disclosed in claim 1 could be disposed at ninety-degree angles or were 
required to be disposed only at acute or obtuse angles.111  The parties 
originally stipulated that the term “baffle” meant a “means for 
obstructing, impeding or checking the flow of something.”112  The parties 
did not, however, stipulate or define the angle of orientation of the 
baffles.113  The patentee invoked the doctrine of claim differentiation,114 
and argued that because subsequent dependent claims specified an angle 
of orientation for the disclosed baffles, but claim 1 did not, the doctrine 
precluded the judge from reading a specific angle requirement into claim 
1.115  The alleged infringer, AWH Corporation, argued that the language 
of claim 1 inadequately defined the term “baffle,” and therefore the judge 
should construe the term in light of the narrower description in the 
specification.116 
The district court claim construction analysis began with the intrinsic 
evidence and, in particular, with the language of the claims construed in 
light of the specification and the diagrams.117  Indeed, the judge cited 
Vitronics for the proposition that the intrinsic evidence is “the most 
significant source of the legally operative meaning of disputed claim 
language.”118  The judge also looked at the Phillips patent prosecution 
history—which is also part of the intrinsic evidence.119  In citing 
Vitronics the judge further explained that a court should limit its use of 
 
                                                     
 111. Phillips v. AWH Corp., No. 97 MK 212(CBS), 2002 WL 32827996, at *11 (D. Colo. Nov. 
22, 2002). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text (explaining the doctrine of claim 
differentiation). 
 115. Phillips, 2002 WL 32827996, at *11.  Otherwise, these dependent claims would be 
redundant. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at *4. 
 118. Id. at *10 (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 
1996)). 
 119. Id. at *6. 
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extrinsic evidence to define a disputed term when the intrinsic record is 
unambiguous as to that term’s meaning.120 
The court explained that although a judge should not use the 
specification to limit the scope of the claims, there are several exceptions 
to this general rule.121  First, when a patentee describes only one 
embodiment of the invention and fails to designate it as the “best mode” 
or “preferred embodiment,” a court can view that single embodiment as 
the only patented embodiment of the invention instead of simply the best 
version of the invention.122  Second, when the specification specifically 
sets forth a special definition for a term and/or the intended meaning of a 
claim term is unclear in the context of the claims, the narrower scope and 
language of the specification controls construction of the term.123  Third, 
when a patentee expresses a claim element in “means-plus-function”124 
format defining the function of the element but not its structure, a court 
looks to descriptions of that structure in the specification to define and 
limit the element in the claims.125 
After stating the relevant claim construction law, the judge turned to 
the Phillips patent claim language, written description, and diagrams.  
The judge first determined that the definition of the term “baffles” 
remained ambiguous in the context of the claims, despite the parties’ 
stipulated definition.126  Further, the judge determined that claim 1 was 
written as a “means-plus-function” description.127  The judge also noted 
that “[a]ll of the diagrams display[ed] the internal baffles extending from 
an acute or oblique angle to the wall faces.  No diagram show[ed] a 
baffle extending internally at a right angle to a face wall in a T-shaped 
form or connecting the two wall faces.”128  The judge concluded that 
because Phillips described and diagramed only baffles extending 
inwardly from the modular wall faces at angles other than ninety 
degrees, and did not designate these diagrams or descriptions as the “best 
mode,” the scope of the claims was limited to baffles disposed at angles 
                                                     
 120. Id. at *4. 
 121. Id. at *5. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (“An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a 
means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in 
support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or 
acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.”). 
 125. Phillips, 2002 WL 32827996, at *5. 
 126. Id. at *12. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at *2. 
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other than ninety degrees as disclosed in the specification.129  The judge 
reasoned that in light of the aforementioned exceptions, she appropriately 
limited the definition and scope of the term “baffle” in claim 1 to the 
usage of the term in the specification.130 
The judge also reasoned that the narrower definition was consistent 
with both the parties’ stipulated definition and the prosecution history.131  
For example, in order for the baffles to check, impede, or obstruct the 
flow of anything that may impact the module walls (per the stipulated 
definition), the baffles cannot be perpendicular to the surface of these 
walls.132  The judge also noted that the originally presented language of 
claim 1 did not contain any reference to baffles at all, but that Phillips 
later added this reference in response to, and in order to overcome, a 
prior art rejection from the patent examiner.133  Upon inspection of the 
prior art, the judge determined that perpendicular baffles would lack 
novelty over the prior art and render the Phillips patent invalid.134  
Therefore, in accordance with the general principle that courts must 
attempt to construe patent claims so as to uphold their validity, the judge 
determined that Phillips’s baffles were not disposed at perpendicular 
angles.135 
In light of the construed definition, the district court judge granted 
AWH Corporation’s motion for summary judgment of 
noninfringement.136  Phillips appealed to the Federal Circuit, arguing that 
the district court improperly read limitations from the specification into 
the claims.137 
                                                     
 129. Id. at *12–13. 
 130. Id. at *12. 
 131. Id. at *12–13. 
 132. Id. at *12. 
 133. Id. at *2–3.  The prosecution history indicated that the term “baffle” was added in an 
amendment to claim 1 intended to overcome a prior art reference.  The prior art reference, U.S. 
Patent No. 3,899,043 to Hall (filed July 29, 1974), available at http://www.uspto.gov (search 
“Patents” using Patent Number), disclosed a modular wall system designed to resist sound and fire.  
The modular walls disclosed in Hall were sandwiched together, linked by perpendicular steel studs 
and joined with a sealant. 
 134. Phillips, 2002 WL 32627540 at *13. 
 135. Id.; see also SUNG & SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, § 1:8 (explaining the principle that courts 
try to interpret claims to preserve their validity). 
 136. Phillips v. AWH Corp., No. 97-MK-212(CBS), 2003 WL 23724191, at *1 (D. Colo., Jan. 
22, 2003), rev’d, 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1332 (2006). 
 137. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 363 F.3d 1207, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated, 376 F.3d 1382 
(Fed. Cir. 2004), rev’d, 415 F.3d 1303, cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1332. 
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2. Federal Circuit Panel Review 
On appeal, Federal Circuit Judges Newman and Lourie affirmed the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement.138  
Although the majority disagreed with the district court’s determination 
that claim 1 included “means-plus-function” language, the panel 
ultimately concluded that the district court judge properly construed the 
meaning of the term “baffle.”139  Federal Circuit Judge Dyk dissented 
from the opinion.140 
The panel majority began its analysis of the Phillips patent with the 
language of the claims in light of the specification, prosecution history, 
and other intrinsic evidence.141  It explained that the presumption in favor 
of the ordinary and customary meaning of a disputed term “baffle” is 
overcome “if the intrinsic evidence shows that the patentee distinguished 
that term from prior art on the basis of a particular embodiment, 
expressly disclaimed subject matter, or described a particular 
embodiment as important to the invention.”142  The majority then noted 
Phillips’s numerous references in the patent to the impact and projectile-
resistant properties of the modular wall system.143  After reading the 
specification, it determined that Phillips viewed impact resistance as an 
important or essential feature of the invention and that baffles disposed at 
ninety-degree angles would not have provided this feature.144  The 
majority also agreed with the district court judge’s determination that the 
baffles in the Phillips patent had to be orientated at angles other than 
ninety degrees in order to avoid the prior art.145  For all of these reasons, 
it determined that the district court judge’s claim construction did not 
erroneously import limitations from the specification into the claims, as 
argued by Phillips.146  The panel majority concluded that “[i]nspection of 
the patent shows that baffles angled at other than ninety degrees is the  
 
                                                     
 138. Id. at 1209. 
 139. Id. at 1212. 
 140. Id. at 1216. 
 141. Id. at 1212–13. 
 142. Id. at 1213 (citing CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366–67 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002)).  However, a judge may only be able to determine the ordinary and customary meaning 
of the term by first referencing a dictionary. 
 143. Id. at 1213–14.  References to the impact resistance of the invention can be found in the 
abstract, the discussion of short-comings of prior art, the disclosure of the invention, and the 
discussion of the diagrams. 
 144. Id. at 1213. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 1214. 
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only embodiment disclosed in the patent; it is the invention [and] [i]t is 
impossible to derive anything else from the specification.”147 
Federal Circuit Judge Dyk, dissenting, argued that the majority 
improperly limited the scope of the claims to the preferred embodiment 
in the specification, and construed the disputed term “baffle” in a manner 
contrary to the plain meaning stipulated by the parties and supported by 
the dictionary.148  He also did not think that the majority should have 
departed from the plain meaning of the term “baffle” because of prior art 
concerns.149  In his view, the single embodiment disclosed in the patent 
was merely the preferred embodiment.150  He rejected the notion that 
claims must be construed in light of this embodiment when it is the only 
embodiment disclosed.151  He also did not view impact resistance as an 
essential feature of the invention, but merely one of a number of 
objectives achieved by the invention.152  Judge Dyk disagreed with the 
majority’s interpretation that the specification clearly limited the 
invention to baffles disposed at angles other than ninety degrees, because 
although the specification did not reference any baffles orientated at 
ninety degrees, it also did not disclaim baffles orientated at ninety 
degrees.153  Accordingly, he concluded that the plain meaning of the term 
“baffle,” and thus the dictionary definition, represented the correct 
construction of the term.154 
Phillips appealed to the Federal Circuit for an en banc rehearing of 
the case. 
B. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Grants 
En Banc Review of Phillips 
1. The Federal Circuit Posed Seven Questions for Consideration En 
Banc 
The Federal Circuit granted Phillips’s petition to rehear the appeal en 
banc “in order to resolve issues concerning the construction of patent 
                                                     
 147. Id. (emphasis added). 
 148. Id. at 1216–17 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 149. Id. at 1218. 
 150. Id. at 1217. 
 151. Id. (citing Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 1218–19 (citing Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1203–04 
(Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
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claims raised by the now-vacated panel majority and dissenting 
opinions.”155  The Federal Circuit posed seven questions to the parties for 
en banc consideration.  The Federal Circuit directed its first questions 
toward the appropriate sources of evidence for claim construction 
analysis: 
1. Is the public notice function of patent claims better served by 
referencing primarily to technical and general purpose dictionaries and 
similar sources to interpret a claim term or by looking primarily to the 
patentee’s use of the term in the specification?  If both sources are to be 
consulted, in what order?156 
The court narrowed its subsequent questions to specific alternative 
circumstances where either the dictionary or the specification was 
regarded as the primary source for claim construction.157  The Federal 
Circuit posed its final question regarding its standard of review: 
7. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Markman v. 
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 116 S. Ct. 1384, 134 L. Ed. 
2d 577 (1996), and our en banc decision in Cybor Corp. v. FAS 
Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998), is it appropriate for 
                                                     
 155. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 156. Id. at 1383. 
 157. Id.  The other questions asked: 
2. If dictionaries should serve as the primary source for claim interpretation, should the 
specification limit the full scope of claim language (as defined by the dictionaries) only 
when the patentee has acted as his own lexicographer or when the specification reflects a 
clear disclaimer of claim scope?  If so, what language in the specification will satisfy 
those conditions?  What use should be made of general as opposed to technical 
dictionaries?  How does the concept of ordinary meaning apply if there are multiple 
dictionary definitions of the same term?  If the dictionary provides multiple potentially 
applicable definitions for a term, is it appropriate to look to the specification to determine 
what definition or definitions should apply? 
3. If the primary source for claim construction should be the specification, what use 
should be made of dictionaries?  Should the range of the ordinary meaning of claim 
language be limited to the scope of the invention disclosed in the specification, for 
example, when only a single embodiment is disclosed and no other indications of breadth 
are disclosed? 
4. Instead of viewing the claim construction methodologies in the majority and dissent of 
the now-vacated panel decision as alternative, conflicting approaches, should the two 
approaches be treated as complementary methodologies such that there is a dual 
restriction on claim scope, and a patentee must satisfy both limiting methodologies in 
order to establish the claim coverage it seeks? 
5. When, if ever, should claim language be narrowly construed for the sole purpose of 
avoiding invalidity under, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 and 112? 
6. What role should prosecution history and expert testimony by one of ordinary skill in 
the art play in determining the meaning of the disputed claim terms? 
Id. 
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this court to accord any deference to any aspect of trial court claim 
construction rulings?  If so, on what aspects, in what circumstances, 
and to what extent?158 
The court also invited the submission of amicus curiae briefs on any 
or all of these questions by any interested parties and specifically 
addressed an invitation to the USPTO to submit a brief.159  Circuit Judge 
Rader concurred in the opinion and added an additional—and perhaps 
more poignant—question to be considered by the parties and amicus 
curiae briefs: 
Is claim construction amenable to resolution by resort to strictly 
algorithmic rules, e.g., specification first, dictionaries first, etc.?  Or is 
claim construction better achieved by using the order or tools relevant 
in each case to discern the meaning of terms according to the 
understanding of one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the 
invention, thus entrusting trial courts to interpret claims as a contract or 
statute?160 
In posing these questions, the court indicated it planned not only to 
address the claim construction analyses at issue, but planned also to settle 
the broader issue of its intracircuit split arising out of the Vitronics and 
Texas Digital line of cases.161 
2. The Patent Bar’s Response 
In anticipation of the en banc rehearing patent commentators wrote 
numerous articles.  In response to the seven questions posed to the 
parties and patent bar generally, the Federal Circuit received over thirty-
five amicus curiae briefs.  Many of these called for the court to advocate 
a specific set of rules for conducting claim construction.162 
                                                     
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 1383–84. 
 160. Id. at 1384 (Rader, J., concurring).  Chief Judge Mayer did not believe any of these 
questions could reasonably be answered until the court revisits Markman and Cybor: 
[A]ny attempt to refine the process is futile.  Nearly a decade of confusion has resulted 
from the fiction that claim construction is a matter of law, when it is obvious that it 
depends on underlying factual determinations which, like all factual questions if disputed, 
are the province of the trial court, reviewable on appeal for clear error.  To pretend 
otherwise inspires cynicism.  Therefore, and because I am convinced that shuffling our 
current precedent merely continues a charade, I dissent from the en banc order. 
Id. (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
 161. Johnson, supra note 3, at 521; Molenda, supra note 2, at 911. 
 162. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1306–08 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied 126 S. 
Ct. 1332 (2006) (listing the amicus curiae briefs filed); see also Patently-O: Patent Law Blog, 
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Some commentators argued that the “dictionary first” approach 
would eventually promote uniformity by formalizing the claim 
construction process.163  They contended that by relying on dictionary 
definitions to construe claim terms, courts would eventually force 
inventors to formalize the language used in patent drafting, which, in 
turn, would lead to a more formalized and standardized system of patent 
claim drafting.164  Further, this practice would encourage patent drafters 
to specify a preferred dictionary during prosecution or include a glossary 
of definitions in the patent itself.165 
However, other commentators pointed out the practical difficulties 
with the “dictionary first” method, particularly when dealing with 
existing (instead of future) patents.166  For example, determining which 
dictionaries were publicly available at the time of issue or application of 
the patent and subsequently locating those dictionaries may be an 
impossible task in some cases.167  Some commentators also argued that 
dictionaries and other extrinsic evidence are too subjective and do not 
focus the claim construction inquiry on the meaning of the claims in the 
context of the entire patent.168  “[I]f a court does need to look to a 
dictionary or treatise to find the meaning of a word, it follows that the 
word for which they search has a meaning that is not ‘ordinary’ or 
‘customary’ at all,”169 or at least not to the court.  Accordingly, these 
commentators insisted, courts should limit the use of dictionaries to only 
those introduced into evidence by the parties during litigation and only at 
the district court stage.170  The USPTO argued that courts should not use 
                                                                                                                                  
http://www.patentlyobviousblog.com/2004/09/phillips_.html (Sept. 23, 2004) (providing most of the 
amicus curiae briefs filed).  Of course, the real question is whether or not any of these proffered 
methodologies are worth adopting. 
 163. See, e.g., Ruoyu Roy Wang, Texas Digital Systems v. Telegenix, Inc.: Toward a More 
Formalistic Patent Claim Construction Model, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 153, 165–69 (2004). 
 164. Id.  This argument assumes that all dictionaries agree on a given term’s meaning, when in 
fact, there are often discrepancies among dictionary definitions. 
 165. Miller & Hilsenteger, supra note 87, at 891–93. 
 166. Matthews, supra note 3, at 159–64; Brief for Amici Curiae Intel Corp. et al. at 7–11, 
Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (Nos. 03-1269, -1286), available at http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/ 
files/IBM.pdf. 
 167. Brief for Amici Curiae Intel Corp. et al., supra note 166, at 7–8. 
 168. Johnson, supra note 3, at 529–31.  Dictionaries are perhaps more objective than the 
intrinsic evidence, though, because the patentee in drafting the patent documents could have chosen 
any meaning ex ante, whereas the dictionary provides a limited selection of meanings. 
 169. Id. at 532–34 (emphasis omitted); see also Brief for Amicus Curiae American Intellectual 
Property Law Ass’n in Support of Neither Party at 12, Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (Nos. 03-1269, -
1286), available at http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/files/AIPLA.pdf (stating that a dictionary 
may not provide the ordinary meaning that is relevant to the case). 
 170. Johnson, supra note 3, at 541–42.  This suggestion, by implication, severely limits the 
Federal Circuit’s discretion on appeal and as a practical matter does not square with de novo review 
or claim construction as a matter of law. 
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dictionaries as primary reference tools because the Office does not 
generally use them when prosecuting patents.171 
The amicus curiae briefs espoused a number of different claim 
construction approaches, most of which advocated very specific claim 
construction methodologies.  Law Professors R. Polk Wagner and Joseph 
Scott Miller advocated that the specification should control only if it is 
unambiguous and specific; otherwise, courts should use the plain 
dictionary meaning of the term.172  This approach would encourage 
patentees to further remove any ambiguity from their patents, or risk 
having their claims construed according to unintended dictionary 
definitions, which may, or may not, fall in their favor.173  The 
International Trade Commission Trial Lawyers Association contended 
that the prosecution history and specification should control over other 
types of evidence, but that if a court uses dictionaries or other similar 
reference materials, technical dictionaries and treatises should have a 
rebuttable preference over other, nontechnical, sources.174 
3. The Federal Circuit’s Analysis of Available Evidentiary Sources for 
Claim Construction 
The Federal Circuit phrased the central question it hoped to answer 
in Phillips as “the extent to which [judges] should resort to and rely on a 
patent’s specification in seeking to ascertain the proper scope of its 
claims.”175  The court began analyzing the Phillips patent by reaffirming 
the general rules of patent claim construction, namely, that courts should 
define claim terms according to their ordinary and customary meaning as 
would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art, in the 
context of the entire patent.176  The court also stated that if the plain 
meaning of the term is commonly understood or readily apparent, 
                                                     
 171. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (Nos. 03-1269,  
-1286), available at http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/files/govt_phillips_brief.pdf. 
 172. Brief of Amicus Curiae Patent Law Professors R. Polk Wagner & Joseph Scott Miller at 2–
3, 13, Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (Nos. 03-1269, -1286), available at http://patentlaw.typepad.com/ 
patent/files/Phillips_Amicus_Wagner_Miller.pdf. 
 173. Id. at 9–10.  Of course, the existing law already mandates that patentees remove ambiguity 
from their patent documents. 
 174. Brief of Amicus Curiae International Trade Commission Trial Lawyers Ass’n in Support of 
Neither Party and Supporting Neither Reversal nor Affirmance at 2, 6, Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (Nos. 
03-1269, -1286), available at http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/files/itctla_amicus_br.PDF. 
 175. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312.  The en banc court consisted of Federal Circuit Judges Michel, 
Newman, Mayer, Lourie, Clevenger, Rader, Schall, Bryson, Gajarsa, Linn, Dyk, and Prost.  Id. at 
1308–09. 
 176. Id. at 1312–13. 
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“general purpose dictionaries may be helpful” to the court’s 
understanding of how a person of ordinary skill in the art would 
understand it.177  However, the court recognized that in many cases that 
give rise to litigation, the meaning of a disputed term is often more 
obscure and each party legitimately believes its definition is the “correct” 
one.  It stated that the 
meaning of a claim term as understood by persons of skill in the art is 
often not immediately apparent, and because patentees frequently use 
terms idiosyncratically, the court looks to “those sources available to 
the public that show what a person of skill in the art would have 
understood disputed claim language to mean.”178 
“Those sources” include both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence.179  The 
court then proceeded to analyze the relative importance of these various 
sources. 
a. Intrinsic Evidence 
The claim construction analysis began with the language of the 
disputed claim itself, the context and usage of the disputed term within 
that claim, and the other claims of the patent.180  The court referred to the 
patent claims, both asserted and unasserted, as “valuable sources” 
providing “substantial guidance as to the meaning of particular claim 
terms.”181  According to the court, differences and similarities among the 
usage of the same, similar, or different claim terms can usually 
illuminate the meaning of the term in question.182  Next, the court 
instructed that the claims must, however, be read in the context of the 
specification and cannot be construed in a vacuum.  According to the 
court, “[t]he claims are directed to the invention that is described in the 
specification; they do not have meaning removed from the context from  
 
                                                     
 177. Id. at 1314.  The court later defines ordinary meaning differently during its discussion of 
the Texas Digital method.  “Properly viewed, the ‘ordinary meaning’ of a claim term is its meaning 
to the ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent.”  Id. at 1321.  This second definition suggests 
that courts should not look to the dictionary to determine the plain meaning of a term, but perhaps 
hear expert testimony from persons of ordinary skill in the art as to their understanding of the patent. 
 178. Id. at 1314 (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 
1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 1314–15. 
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which they arose.”183  The specification is particularly useful when an 
inventor has defined or disclaimed a definition for the disputed term.184 
The Federal Circuit concluded its analysis of intrinsic evidence 
sources by fully endorsing heavy reliance on the specification in 
construing claim terms.185  As an afterthought, the court added that a 
judge should also consult the prosecution history, when the parties have 
offered it into evidence, because it can provide objective insight into how 
the inventor and USPTO perceived the invention at the time of filing and 
how that perception changed during ongoing prosecution of the claims.186  
For example, the inventor may have specially defined or disclaimed a 
given meaning for a claim term in a correspondence with the USPTO.  
However, the court cautioned that the prosecution history is a less 
relevant intrinsic source, often lacking requisite clarity, because it 
represents an ongoing communication between the patentee and the 
patent examiner and not the final coherent product.187  Therefore, it may 
not add significantly to the understanding of a judge when the meaning 
of the disputed term is already ambiguous.188 
Although its analysis began with the particular language of the 
claims, the Federal Circuit seemed to emphasize the probative value of 
the specification over all other sources.189  General principles of patent 
law, however, support this position.  The Code of Federal Regulations 
requires that “terms and phrases used in the claims must find clear 
support or antecedent basis in the [specification] so that the meaning of 
the terms in the claims may be ascertainable by reference to the 
[specification].”190  Thus, the regulations clearly contemplate that one 
reads the claims in the context of the specification, not divorced from it. 
b. Extrinsic Evidence 
Although courts are authorized to consider extrinsic evidence in 
construing a disputed term, the Federal Circuit finds this evidence “less 
significant than the intrinsic record in determining ‘the legally operative 
                                                     
 183. Id. at 1316 (citing Netword, L.L.C. v. Centraal Corp., 242 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 
2001)). 
 184. Id. at 1315. 
 185. Id. at 1317. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(d)(1) (2000). 
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meaning of claim language.’”191  According to the court, a judge may 
find dictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises useful in claim 
construction.  In particular, such sources help judges become familiar 
with the technical terminology and understand the underlying technology 
of a patented invention.192  These sources also give judges insight into 
the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art.193  Expert 
testimony can similarly provide a judge with useful background 
information, explain how an invention works, and help ensure that a 
judge’s understanding of the technical aspects of the patent is consistent 
with the state of the relevant art.194 
The Federal Circuit, however, cautioned against relying too heavily 
on the extrinsic evidence when construing claim terms.  Extrinsic 
evidence, the court explained, is not part of the public record, and unlike 
the specification, was not created specifically to describe the scope and 
meaning of the patented invention.  Extrinsic evidence also may not 
accurately reflect the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the 
relevant art.195  The court also pointed out that unlike intrinsic evidence, 
extrinsic evidence is “generated at the time of and for the purpose of 
litigation.  . . . [E]ach party will naturally choose the pieces of extrinsic 
evidence most favorable to its cause, leaving the court the considerable 
task of filtering the useful extrinsic evidence from the fluff.”196  
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded that although both sources of 
evidence are admissible, as a matter of judicial discretion, extrinsic 
evidence is less reliable than intrinsic evidence for the purpose of 
construing patent claims.197  However, according to the court many of 
these assumptions regarding extrinsic evidence do not necessarily apply 
to dictionaries and other similar reference sources, which is why the 
Federal Circuit next needed to explain what it meant in Texas Digital. 
                                                     
 191. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (quoting C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 
862 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 192. Id. at 1318.  The court later addresses the Texas Digital categorization of dictionaries as 
part of the intrinsic evidence.  See infra notes 200–01 and accompanying text. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. (citing Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1308–09 (Fed. Cir. 
1999)). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id.  One can argue, however, that the patent documents are similarly generated for the 
purpose of litigation.  Shrewd patent attorneys necessarily draft patent documents with an eye 
toward possible litigation anticipating any issues that may arise. 
 197. Id. at 1319. 
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c. Texas Digital Explained 
The Federal Circuit, in addressing its intracircuit split, stated that the 
principles already outlined were the same general claim construction 
principles that the court had clearly articulated on “numerous occasions,” 
but that a recent line of cases arising after Texas Digital placed greater 
emphasis on dictionary definitions and “assigned a less prominent role to 
the specification and the prosecution history” in construing disputed 
terms.198  The court then attempted to clarify and explain its panel 
decision in Texas Digital.199 
The Federal Circuit agreed with the Texas Digital panel’s concern 
regarding improperly importing limitations into the claims from the 
specification.200  However, the court believed that the remedy chosen by 
the Texas Digital panel—the “dictionary first” approach—placed too 
much emphasis on the extrinsic evidence and inappropriately de-
emphasized the importance of the intrinsic evidence.201  According to the 
court, consulting the dictionary as the threshold step (and only consulting 
the specification as a “check on the dictionary meaning of the term”) 
“improperly restricts the role of the specification in claim construction . . 
. [and] focuses the inquiry on the abstract meaning of words rather than 
on the meaning of claim terms within the context of the patent.”202 
The Federal Circuit further explained that because dictionaries can 
contain expansive lists of definitions for a single term, consulting the 
dictionary before reading the patent would cause courts to define 
disputed terms too broadly.203  In addition, even though under Texas 
Digital courts may narrow these broad definitions using the specification, 
if a court fails to “appreciate how the specification implicitly limits that 
definition, the error will systematically cause the construction of the 
claim to be unduly expansive.”204  To avoid this, the Federal Circuit 
advocated that claim construction analyses should begin with the 
intrinsic evidence “rather than starting with a broad definition and 
whittling it down.”205  The Federal Circuit also pointed to various 
                                                     
 198. Id. 
 199. Id.  The Circuit Judges on the Texas Digital panel were Michel, Schall, and Linn.  Tex. 
Digital Sys. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  All three were a part of the 
Phillips en banc rehearing.  Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1308. 
 200. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319–20. 
 201. Id. at 1320. 
 202. Id. at 1320–21. 
 203. Id. at 1321. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
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practical considerations that arise when using dictionaries to define 
terms.206  For example, patents intrinsically relate to previously unknown 
subject matter, whereas dictionaries relate to existing information and 
known terms and, therefore, cannot be expected to account for new 
subject matter that may be disclosed in a patent.207  Consulting 
dictionaries and other similar sources as the primary type of evidence is 
problematic because of discrepancies that can occur between the subject 
matter of the patent, which inherently must be novel, and the subject 
matter of the dictionary definitions, which inherently is not.208 
d. Texas Digital Unexplained 
If the Federal Circuit had ended its analysis here, district courts, 
litigants, inventors, and patent attorneys would have had a relatively 
workable standard for drafting claims at the outset and conducting claim 
construction in the event of litigation.  The analysis thus far, while 
stating nothing new, provided a reasonably clear hierarchy of evidence 
and a suggested order for consulting such evidence when interpreting 
claims.  The Federal Circuit, however, seemed uncomfortable with these 
specific and moderately fixed rules and therefore began qualifying many 
of the previous statements it had made.  In doing so, however, it only 
complicated matters and effectively ruined any sense of guidance 
provided by the initial analysis. 
The Federal Circuit began by saying it “[did] not intend to preclude 
the appropriate use of dictionaries”209 and that “[a] dictionary definition 
has the value of being an unbiased source ‘accessible to the public in 
advance of litigation.’”210  Further, “judges are free to consult 
dictionaries and technical treatises ‘at any time in order to better to 
understand the underlying technology and may also rely on dictionary 
definitions when construing claim terms.’”211  Contradicting its earlier 
                                                     
 206. Id.  The court stated: 
Dictionaries, by their nature, provide an expansive array of definitions.  General 
dictionaries, in particular, strive to collect all uses of particular words, from the common 
to the obscure.  By design, general dictionaries collect the definitions of a term as used 
not only in a particular art field, but in many different settings. 
Id. 
 207. Id. at 1321–22. 
 208. Id. at 1322. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1585 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).  But 
see supra notes 195–96 and accompanying text (describing how the court chastised the use of 
extrinsic evidence because it is not part of the public record). 
 211. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1322 (emphasis added).  Reliance is proper as long as it does not 
 
COOK_FINAL.DOC 1/12/2007  2:59:42 PM 
256 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
criticism of the Texas Digital threshold step, the court stated that while 
reading a patent a judge may even consult this type of evidence “before 
reviewing the remainder of the patent to determine how the patentee has 
used the term.”212  Finally, the en banc court concluded (or conceded) 
that there is “no magic formula or catechism for conducting claim 
construction” and that case-by-case adjudication will ultimately be 
necessary because the particular facts of the patent will determine the 
most appropriate manner for construing the claims.213  Moreover, the 
Federal Circuit expressly approved the Vitronics analysis,214 which it 
believed to be consistent with this flexible approach to claim 
construction.215  However, upon review of the Vitronics panel decision, it 
seems to set forth a distinct set of claim construction rules and a 
particular order of analysis which, in fact, do not appear consistent with 
the flexible approach adopted by the Federal Circuit in Phillips.216 
e. The Federal Circuit’s Construction of the Phillips Patent Claims 
The Federal Circuit began analyzing the patent with the usage of the 
disputed term in the claim itself.  According to the court, claim 1 
imposed only three requirements on the baffles: (1) the baffles must be 
made of steel; (2) they must have load-bearing capacity; and (3) they 
must extend inward from the surface of the walls.217  The court found 
these requirements consistent with the parties’ stipulated dictionary 
definition of the term as a “means for obstructing, impeding or checking 
the flow of something.” 218  The court looked next to use of the term in 
the context of the other claims and concluded that the other claims 
“specify [more] particular functions to be served by the baffles.”219  
Using the doctrine of claim differentiation, the court concluded that 
Phillips did not intend to impose these specific restrictions on the more 
                                                                                                                                  
contradict “‘any definition found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents.’”  Id. at 
1323 (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584 n.6). 
 212. Id. at 1324 (emphasis added); see also supra notes 203–07 and accompanying text 
(discussing the reasons for using intrinsic evidence first). 
 213. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324. 
 214. See supra notes 60–74 and accompanying text (discussing Vitronics and the intrinsic 
evidence standard). 
 215. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324. 
 216. See supra notes 60–74 and accompanying text (discussing Vitronics and the intrinsic 
evidence standard). 
 217. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324.  See supra text accompanying note 109 for the text of claim 1. 
 218. Id.; see also supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 219. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324. 
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general functions of the baffles in claim 1.220  The court then turned to 
the specification and concluded that it did not require all baffles in the 
invention to be disposed at angles other than ninety degrees.221  The court 
further concluded that in light of the claims and the specification, a 
person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the term “baffle,” as 
used in claim 1, to refer to its plain meaning because Phillips did not 
specially define the term and would not understand the term to mean 
only baffles orientated at an angle other than ninety degrees.222 
The district court and Phillips panel had both determined that in light 
of the prosecution history and prior art references cited therein, 
construing the term to include ninety-degree angles would invalidate the 
claim over the existing prior art.223  The Federal Circuit, however, 
clarified that the general rule of construing claims in order to preserve 
their validity only applies if “the court concludes, after applying all the 
available tools of claim construction, that the claim is still ambiguous.”224  
The court cited an 1873 case where the Supreme Court applied the 
doctrine of construing claims to uphold their validity to an ambiguous set 
of claims.225  However, unlike that case, the Federal Circuit determined 
that “the claim term at issue [in Phillips was] not ambiguous” and 
therefore, the doctrine did not apply.226  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit 
rejected the restrictive definition of the term “baffle,” reversed and 
remanded the district court’s grant of summary judgment of 
noninfringement, and vacated the Phillips panel decision.227 
f. The Federal Circuit Declines to Address De Novo Review 
In a short paragraph at the end of the opinion, the Federal Circuit 
acknowledged that it had posed the question of de novo review for 
consideration en banc.  However, after considering the issue, it stated it  
 
                                                     
 220. See id. at 1325 (“If the baffles recited in claim 1 were inherently placed at specific angles, 
or interlocked to form an intermediate barrier, claim 6 would be redundant.”). 
 221. Id. at 1327. 
 222. Id. at 1325. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 1327 (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 911 (Fed. Cir. 
2004)). 
 225. Klein v. Russell, 86 U.S. 433, 466–67 (1873). 
 226. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1328.  This conclusion is not very persuasive considering the district 
court and Federal Circuit panel both had difficulty defining the term. 
 227. Id. 
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would not address the matter at this time.  It also declined to discuss or 
reevaluate Cybor.228 
C. The Claim Construction Approach Adopted by the Federal Circuit in 
Phillips Does Not Promote Uniformity, Certainty, or Accuracy 
1. The Federal Circuit’s Analysis of the Law of Claim Construction 
Fails to Provide Adequate Guidelines 
The Federal Circuit in Phillips purported to clarify claim 
construction guidelines.  In reality, however, the court did not adopt any 
specific rules and provided no clear-cut guidance regarding how a judge 
should approach claim construction.  As a result, the law of claim 
construction is perhaps less clear now than it was before the Phillips 
decision.229  The Federal Circuit’s adopted approach undoubtedly 
increases a judge’s flexibility in conducting claim construction analysis.  
However, this increased flexibility is directly correlated to an increased 
unpredictability in the claim construction process from the perspective of 
a litigant (or anyone else attempting to interpret the claims). 
One only has to look at the Phillips decision itself, in light of the 
panel and district court decisions, to see evidence that the claim 
construction analysis adopted by the Federal Circuit does not promote 
certainty or predictability.  For example, the district court and the 
original panel majority, using only intrinsic evidence, determined that the 
meaning of the term “baffle” was limited to orientations at angles other 
than ninety degrees.230  Both courts reached this conclusion after 
analyzing the language of the claims construed in light of the 
specification.  Neither court relied on the Texas Digital “dictionary first” 
approach or extrinsic evidence in construing the meaning of the term.  
Thus, the claim construction principles utilized by the district court and 
Federal Circuit panel are the same general principles restated and 
expressly adopted by the en banc court in Phillips.  Yet, the en banc 
court, after conducting the claim construction analysis de novo, found the 
                                                     
 228. Id. 
 229. See id. at 1330 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (“[A]fter proposing no fewer than seven questions, 
receiving more than thirty amici curiae briefs, and whipping the bar into a frenzy of expectation, [the 
court] say[s] nothing new, but merely restate[s] what has become the practice over the last ten 
years—that [it] will decide cases according to whatever mode or method results in the outcome [the 
court] desire[s], or at least allows [it] a seemingly plausible way out of the case.”). 
 230. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 363 F.3d 1207, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated, 376 F.3d 1382 
(Fed. Cir. 2004), rev’d, 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1332 (2006); 
Phillips v. AWH Corp., No. 97 MK212(CBS), 2002 WL 32827996, at *12 (D. Colo. Nov. 22, 2002). 
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disputed term to have a different meaning.231  Moreover, the Phillips 
dissent applied these same claim construction principles, but ultimately 
agreed with the district court and panel majority as to the meaning of the 
disputed term.232  Whereas, the dissent in the original Phillips panel 
decision relied on Texas Digital and the “dictionary first” approach 
instead of the specification—an approach which the Federal Circuit 
purported to reject in Phillips—but reached the same conclusion as the 
en banc court as to the meaning of the term “baffle.”233  It is no wonder 
the patent bar is confused about the appropriate standards for claim 
construction. 
Upon review of the district court, panel majority, and en banc 
opinions, one finds it difficult to distinguish the difference in the overall 
analyses applied by the district court, Federal Circuit panel, and en banc 
court.234  Specifically, the district court, panel majority, and Federal 
Circuit en banc decisions each construed the claims in light of the 
specification and considered the various types of evidence in the same 
order.235  Ultimately, however, the Federal Circuit reversed the district 
court and original panel decisions.  Thus, there is a distinction to be 
made between applying the correct legal standard—which both lower 
court decisions did—and reaching the correct claim construction result—
which both lower court decisions apparently did not.  Under the current 
claim construction “guidelines,” one can apply the correct legal standard, 
but reach the incorrect result, and apply the incorrect legal standard, but 
still reach the correct result.  This much is evidenced by the various 
majority and dissenting opinions.  The result in Phillips emphasizes the 
uncertainty of the appeals process and suggests to litigants that they 
cannot predict the outcome of their appeal based on whether or not the 
lower court applies the “right” or “wrong” claim construction principles. 
Part of the problem stems from the numerous pitfalls a court may get 
stuck in during the process of claim construction, pitfalls that the Federal 
Circuit may or may not catch on appeal.  It also stems from the fact that 
the Federal Circuit has failed to provide adequate and uniform claim 
                                                     
 231. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1328. 
 232. Id. at 1329 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 233. See supra notes 148–52 and accompanying text (stating that the district court erroneously 
construed the term “baffles”). 
 234. The one thing that does stand out among these three opinions is the Federal Circuit’s 
determination that the disputed term “baffle” is not ambiguous.  Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1328.  If the 
meaning of the disputed term was straightforward, it is unlikely the case would have made it so far 
in litigation. 
 235. Id. at 1324.  Note though, the Federal Circuit specifically stated in Phillips that there is no 
required order of analysis. 
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construction guidelines throughout its numerous panel and en banc 
decisions since Markman II.  The Federal Circuit should have addressed 
not only the district court’s analysis of the disputed terms, but also the 
law on which the district court relied and applied to the disputed terms. 
The district court had supported its construction of the disputed term, 
which was ultimately held to be incorrect, with Federal Circuit 
precedent.236  Perhaps if the Federal Circuit had addressed, clarified, or 
corrected the district court’s use of this precedent instead of merely 
stating alternative case law to support its position on appeal, 
distinguishing these cases would be less complicated.  It would also be 
easier for other district courts to avoid these same pitfalls in their claim 
construction inquiries.  However, it would also limit the Federal Circuit’s 
flexibility to pick and choose among various precedents for support in 
subsequent claim construction decisions.  The unpredictability in the 
appeals process is directly related to the Federal Circuit’s desire to retain 
this flexibility, at the cost of certainty and uniformity, and its seeming 
inability to decide on a set of clear-cut guidelines.  Without distinct 
guidelines, lower courts will be left to wander among the conflicting 
standards of existing precedent, interpreting it for themselves, only to be 
reversed on appeal to the Federal Circuit. 
2. Resolving Claim Construction by Resort to Strictly Algorithmic 
Rules 
It seems as though nearly everyone but the Federal Circuit can 
decide on a specific claim construction standard.  The Federal Circuit’s 
failure to adopt a specific rubric of rules in Phillips was definitely not 
due to a shortage of methodologies to choose from.237  However, to be 
fair to the Federal Circuit judges, there is also no unanimous agreement 
among the patent bar as to the preferred analysis for claim construction.  
Therefore, perhaps instead of picking one of the numerous proffered 
methodologies, the Federal Circuit merely chose not to select one at all.  
However, as explained below, this decision carries with it a number of 
implications for the patent system that the Federal Circuit judges may not 
have contemplated. 
The court’s admission that claim construction requires case-by-case 
adjudication and that the particular facts of each case will determine the 
best manner for construing the claims underscores the argument that 
                                                     
 236. See supra notes 118–20. 
 237. See supra notes 162–74 and accompanying text. 
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claim construction is, at least in part, an inherently fact-based endeavor 
and should be reviewed on appeal with some amount of deference.238  
Yet, the court in Phillips declined to address de novo review.  Moreover, 
even under a deferential standard of review, case-by-case adjudication 
will still result in inconsistent caselaw without substantially more 
guidance from the Federal Circuit on the proper methodology for 
construing claims.  Because the facts of a particular case control the 
claim construction inquiry, but the Federal Circuit is not bound by any of 
the district court’s findings of fact with regard to the construed claim, the 
Federal Circuit must adopt a distinct set of rules for claim construction if 
this area of law is ever to have any uniformity or predictability—features 
that are essential to a strong patent system.239  Patents must be 
predictably and uniformly construed “for the protection of the patentee, 
the encouragement of the inventive genius of others and the assurance 
that the subject of the patent will be dedicated ultimately to the 
public.”240 
Instead, the Federal Circuit in Phillips adopted what one 
commentator terms the “holistic approach”—one having no set 
methodology.241  The bright-line “dictionary first” rule from Texas 
Digital supplies at least an illusion of certainty.242  Whereas, the “holistic 
approach” does not even supply this illusion—it promotes neither 
innovation nor certainty.243  With no set standard, inventors and patent 
attorneys will spend considerable time drafting patent documents in 
anticipation of the different judges they may encounter in the event of 
litigation.244  They must attempt to draft documents in such a way that 
everyone imaginable clearly understands what is being claimed.  They 
                                                     
 238. For a compelling argument that the Federal Circuit must reexamine the fact/law distinction 
in claim construction all together in light of recent decisions, see Bonini, supra note 10, at 483–87. 
 239. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman II), 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) 
(“Finally, we see the importance of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent as an independent 
reason to allocate all issues of construction to the court.”). 
 240. Id.  As the Supreme Court has stated:   
 Otherwise, a “zone of uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation may enter only 
at the risk of infringement claims would discourage invention only a little less than 
unequivocal foreclosure of the field,’ and ‘[t]he public [would] be deprived of rights 
supposed to belong to it, without being clearly told what it is that limits these rights.” 
Id. (quoting United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942); Merrill v. 
Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573 (1877)). 
 241. Kaiser, supra note 2, at 1014. 
 242. Id. at 1031. 
 243. Id. at 1032. 
 244. In which case, over time, the problem of ambiguous patents will take care of itself, as 
patentees spend more time on patent drafting to ensure their patent documents are unambiguous.  
This, however, may not be the desired effect of the Phillips decision. 
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will indiscriminately define every detail and nuance, which may 
ultimately be unnecessary or redundant, and may unduly narrow the 
scope of the claims thereby reducing the patent’s value.  This wastes the 
monetary resources of the inventor and, in many cases, the time of the 
patent attorney.  More work for attorneys equals more cost for patentees 
and, implicitly, fewer patent applications as inventors become less 
inclined to waste their time and money filing for a patent that costs to 
more than it is worth.  Fewer patent applications means a decrease in 
inventions, or at least a reduction in the public disclosure of these 
inventions, and fewer inventions eventually leads to diminishing 
innovation.  Accordingly, while the “holistic approach” allows judges 
more flexibility in construing claims, it also undermines the purposes of 
the patent system as a whole. 
On the other hand, from the perspective of the patent industry (and 
perhaps a more cynical view), patent attorneys want plenty of work and 
they want to be shielded from malpractice lawsuits when a court does not 
decide a case as predicted.  Having no set standard means that patent 
applications will have to be much more carefully drafted, and after 
Phillips, will probably all contain a glossary of term definitions at the 
end of the specification.245  This necessarily translates into more work 
(and more money) for patent attorneys.  Further, because there is no set 
standard: (1) it will be impossible to always draft a “perfect” patent that 
avoids litigation; (2) litigation will be much less certain, so there will be 
more appeals which means more work for appellate lawyers; and (3) 
even if the attorney loses on appeal, the unpredictability of the appellate 
process takes the blame.  Therefore, after Phillips, it may be harder for a 
patent attorney to counsel clients, but when it comes to the bottom line, 
no one benefits more than attorneys from the uncertainty of the system. 
3. Certainty Versus Accuracy 
Perhaps the Federal Circuit desires to retain flexibility in claim 
construction so it can ensure that disputed claim terms are ultimately 
construed accurately.  However, does realization of the desired 
uniformity and certainty in claim construction require sacrificing 
accuracy and precision in determining the “correct” meaning of the 
disputed term?  If so, is it worth finding the “correct” definition of a 
disputed term if it means sacrificing certainty and predictability?  This, 
of course, assumes not only that there is a right and wrong way to 
                                                     
 245. This, however, is already a fairly common practice among experienced patent attorneys. 
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construe a term, but also that certainty and accuracy are mutually 
exclusive goals of the claim construction process. 
In light of the public notice function of a patent, the “right answer” 
or “correct meaning” seems to be defined as when persons of ordinary 
skill in the art can readily understand what the patentee meant by the 
terms used in the patent document when it was drafted.  This, in some 
cases, is different from the definition that the patentee would later like to 
ascribe to the term (which likely leads to infringement) or the definition 
that the alleged infringer would like to ascribe to the term (which likely 
does not lead to infringement).  On the other hand, courts seem to be 
bending over backwards to divine the ultimate meaning of disputed 
terms.  Is this an efficient or legitimate use of judicial resources?  One 
commentator thinks not and has argued that courts rarely, if ever, need 
extrinsic evidence to properly construe claim terms.246  He further argues 
that “claim construction should not be an unbounded search for the 
disputed term’s ‘meaning,’ but instead a rational process of selection 
from between the two” alternatives proffered by the parties.247  This 
approach would at least narrow a litigant’s chance of reversal on appeal 
to fifty/fifty and provide some predictability.  However, this approach 
seems less than ideal if there is concern with the judge determining the 
“right definition” instead of just picking between two biased definitions, 
which may support a party’s position, but which might not be the truly 
correct meaning of the term.248 
4. Clear Claim Construction Guidelines Will Lead to Both Certainty 
and Accuracy 
If the Federal Circuit were to pick a distinct rubric of rules, then 
patentees, inventors, patent attorneys, litigators, and the courts would all 
be able to approach patent drafting and claim construction with a degree 
of conformity.249  A clear standard for claim construction will lead to 
both certainty and accuracy in construing claims.  There would be 
certainty at the outset from the perspective of a patentee because a patent 
will not only be drafted according to these rules, it will also be construed 
according to these same rules.  Accordingly, patentees can more clearly 
draft patents with these rules in mind, knowing that patent examiners, 
                                                     
 246. Y’Barbo, supra note 52, at 687–88. 
 247. Id. at 688. 
 248. Of course, it may never be truly possible to determine the ultimate meaning of a word. 
 249. Regardless of whether they agree with those rules, everyone will at least be on the same 
page at the outset. 
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judges, competitors, and persons of ordinary skill in the art will use these 
same rules in construing the patent claims and hopefully understand their 
intended meaning.  While drafting the patent, patentees would be able to 
run through a clear checklist of requirements to test the patent’s 
“definitional correctness” and clarity.  Patent examiners would use a 
similar checklist and know the standard to which they must hold the 
patent in order for it to be accurately construed by the courts in the event 
of litigation.  Everyone would know in advance which aspects were 
being left up to chance and which aspects were no longer open for 
debate.  Then, the patent will necessarily have been drafted according to 
its “correct meaning”—the meaning intended by the patentee and readily 
understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art—and thus, will be 
construed accurately. 
Even if the Federal Circuit does not adopt a specific rubric of rules, 
the USPTO could impose stricter patent prosecution rules requiring 
patentees to define nearly everything at the outset or risk having their 
claims rejected as ambiguous.  Although this heightened standard may 
require patentees to narrow the scope of their invention beyond what 
they would prefer, it would also prevent claim construction cases from 
clogging up the court system with numerous appeals.250  Moreover, it 
would remove the incentive for patentees to be intentionally vague when 
drafting claims.251  However, considering that patent office examiners are 
already over worked, and already spend an insufficient amount of time 
with each patent, this course of action seems to be the less favorable (and 
least likely) of the two.252 
In either case, placing a higher burden on the patentee at the outset 
with a clear set of guidelines to follow, will lead to both more certainty 
and more accuracy in patent drafting and in claim construction. 
5. What About Dictionaries? 
The Federal Circuit spent four pages in Phillips explaining why 
courts should not afford dictionaries the special treatment suggested by 
Texas Digital.  However, it then qualified its position in several 
subsequent paragraphs explaining the value of dictionaries to a claim 
construction inquiry—as if to set them apart from other extrinsic 
                                                     
 250. The judicial and monetary expense and onerous burden of conducting Markman hearings 
would be virtually eliminated. 
 251. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 252. Review of the patent prosecution system indicates that patent examiners spend 
approximately eighteen hours over three years on each patent.  CHISUM ET AL., supra note 14, at 77. 
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evidence in accordance with Texas Digital.  Based on its discussion of 
the general principles of patent law vis-à-vis Texas Digital, it seems 
obvious that the Federal Circuit cannot decide on the appropriate use of 
dictionaries and, therefore, failed to answer its own question on the 
appropriate order for consulting the patent specification and a dictionary 
during claim construction.253  However, dictionaries can serve two 
distinct functions in the context of claim construction that the Federal 
Circuit has never explicitly addressed.  Perhaps it is the dual nature of 
dictionaries that might explain the seemingly inconsistent treatment of 
dictionaries by the Federal Circuit in its decisions. 
There are two different circumstances under which a judge might 
consult a dictionary while conducting a claim construction inquiry.  
Under one circumstance, the term at issue may be a rather ordinary word 
that the judge generally understands in the context of the patent, but 
consults a dictionary in order to ascertain the scope of that term’s 
meaning.254  In that case, the dictionary provides the judge with a variety 
of definitions for the disputed term and tells the judge how the disputed 
term should be defined according to the inventor’s intentions.  This may 
be the use of dictionaries that the Federal Circuit cautioned against in its 
initial discussion of extrinsic evidence and the Texas Digital opinion. 
Under the second circumstance, the term at issue may be an 
extremely technical term of art and the judge has no idea what it means 
during or after reading the patent.  In that case, the judge consults a 
dictionary not because he is looking to be told what the term should 
mean, but rather needs to ascertain what the word means period.255  The 
dictionary is a source of information serving to educate the judge on, and 
introduce the judge to, the relevant technical field for the judge’s own 
initial understanding.  This is perhaps what the Federal Circuit meant by 
the “appropriate use of dictionaries” in claim construction.256  In which 
case, the Federal Circuit’s statements regarding dictionaries are not 
entirely inconsistent, but represent a more practical approach to the two 
distinct functions dictionaries can serve in claim construction.257 
                                                     
 253. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 254. For example, the judge understands the generic meaning of the term, but consults the 
dictionary to see how else one would understand the term. 
 255. Much like a legal practitioner’s use of Black’s Law Dictionary to define an obscure legal 
term. 
 256. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1332 
(2006). 
 257. The Federal Circuit continues to rely on dictionaries in this context, even in the wake of 
Phillips.  See, e.g., Seachange Int’l, Inc. v. C-Cor Inc., 413 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(deciding the case two weeks before Phillips and beginning the claim construction analysis by 
referencing THE NEW IEEE STANDARD DICTIONARY OF ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONICS TERMS (5th 
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D. Implications of De Novo Review Exemplified in Phillips 
Adopting a specific rubric of rules for claim construction would 
promote more uniformity, certainty, and accuracy.  However, it still fails 
to address the underlying and more significant problem of the fact/law 
distinction and standard of review in claim construction cases.  In theory, 
matters of law decided by a single appellate court should result in 
standardized precedent with regard to a given area of law.  In practice, 
however, the Federal Circuit’s claim construction precedent has failed to 
achieve this desired uniformity and has, in fact, resulted in inconsistent 
decisions and conflicting lines of authority leading to confusion and 
uncertainty among lower courts and within the Federal Circuit itself.258  
De novo review after Cybor has only increased the unpredictability of 
the appeals process in infringement litigation.259  For example, the 
Federal Circuit reverses approximately one-third of all patent cases, 
which includes claim construction cases, heard on appeal.260 
The high reversal rate on appeal carries with it substantial economic 
considerations for litigants “because there is no certainty as to the scope 
of [one’s] claims until the Federal Circuit ultimately rules.”261  Under 
existing law, infringement litigation has been fraught with instability due 
to differing methods of claim construction applied within the Federal 
Circuit and, consequently, among district courts, which rely on the 
Federal Circuit for guidance and precedent.262  Thus far, however, the 
Supreme Court’s vision of intrajurisdictional certainty and uniformity in 
Markman II has not been realized by the courts.263  This is in part 
                                                                                                                                  
ed. 1993)); see also N. Am. Container, Inc. v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc., 415 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) (deciding the case two days after Phillips and noting the magistrate judge defined 
“generally convey” with an online dictionary). 
 258. See Burgess, supra note 10, at 782–86 (arguing that the Cybor decision characterizing 
claim construction as a matter of law has resulted in inconsistent decisions and confusion in the 
district courts).  Compare, e.g., Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 
1996) (stating claim construction entails looking to the words of the claims themselves, reviewing 
the specification, considering the prosecution history of the patent, and if necessary, considering 
extrinsic evidence), with Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1201–05 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) (stating that the analytical focus must begin and remain on discerning the ordinary 
meaning of the claim terms through dictionaries or otherwise before resorting to the specification for 
certain limited purposes).  The Federal Circuit was created as a solution to the inconsistent treatment 
of patents among the various federal circuit courts, which underscores the irony of the current 
intracircuit inconsistencies. 
 259. See Chu, supra note 5, at 1097–98 (stating that a litigant has virtually as much of a chance 
of having a patent case reversed as affirmed). 
 260. Id. at 1100. 
 261. Id. at 1079. 
 262. See id. at 1097–98 (stating that a post-Markman I study of all patent cases found a 
consistently high reversal rate). 
 263. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman II), 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) 
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because the Federal Circuit is not consistently applying its own precedent 
in its claim construction decisions.264 
Although the Federal Circuit posed the question of standard of 
review to the parties for consideration on appeal, it refrained from 
deciding the issue in its en banc opinion.265  The Federal Circuit’s failure 
to address the standard of review question demonstrates an inability to 
convincingly rebut the nearly twenty amicus curiae briefs that advocated 
some type of deference to the district court’s claim construction 
determinations.266  If findings of fact were reviewed for clear error, claim 
construction would be consistent with other areas of patent law, such as 
obviousness, where different standards of review are applied to the fact 
and law components of mixed fact and law questions.267  However, 
because claim construction is subject to absolute de novo review, the 
Federal Circuit remains free to conduct its own claim construction 
analysis regardless of whether a lower court applies the claim 
construction principles advocated in Phillips.  Considering the ever 
increasing amount of control asserted over patent law by the Federal 
Circuit since the court’s creation, it could at least defer to the district 
court’s findings of fact regarding a term’s meaning.268  This would 
provide more certainty and/or predictability for litigants and reduce the 
high reversal rate on appeal. 
However, perhaps Federal Circuit Judge Rader was right, and patents 
are simply not amenable to any clear-cut rules.269  It may just be the 
                                                                                                                                  
(recognizing the importance of uniformity in the treatment of patents as an independent reason to 
allocate all construction issues to judges); see also supra notes 239–40 (citing language from 
Markman II). 
 264. This could be due in part to the fact that patent law cases are easier to distinguish from each 
other than other types of cases, because the underlying patents have to be inherently distinguishable. 
 265. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1328. 
 266. Among the groups advocating some type of deference: American Bar Association, 
American Intellectual Property Law Association, Association of Corporate Counsel, Biotechnology 
Industry Organization, Connecticut Intellectual Property Law Association, Federal Circuit Bar 
Association, Fédération International des Conseils en Propriété Industrielle, International Trade 
Commission Trial Lawyers Association, and United States Government.  Conejo Valley Bar 
Association and Parus Holdings, Inc. both argued that deference was inappropriate.  A handful of 
briefs did not address the issue.  See supra note 162 (citing sources that list the amicus briefs filed). 
 267. Hagberg & Pernick, supra note 4, at 4. 
 268. See Sung, supra note 10, at 1250 (discussing the increasing authority over patent law the 
Federal Circuit keeps granting to itself).  At first glance, it seems like deference to district courts in 
different circuits would lead to more uncertainty and less uniformity at the start of litigation because 
some judges are decidedly less “pro patent.”  Moore, supra note 41, at 240–41.  However, once the 
Federal Circuit adopts a distinct set of claim construction guidelines, district courts will no longer be 
free to fashion their own standards for interpreting patents and patent litigants will know right away 
whether the district court applied the correct rules to their patents.  Therefore, they will also know 
their chances of a favorable ruling on appeal. 
 269. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (discussing whether it is better to approach 
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nature of patent claim construction that requires case-by-case 
adjudication and de novo review.  And perhaps the problem is not as bad 
as it seems considering the small number of patents actually litigated 
compared to the number of patents granted each year.270  These unusual 
cases that get litigated might be bad proxies for determining the overall 
state of patent claim construction.  Moreover, care should be taken when 
changing the rules so that in trying to fix the small number of cases that 
make it to litigation, the remainder of the patent system is not injured 
when it may be working just fine. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There are clear inconsistencies within the Federal Circuit under the 
existing law.  In Phillips, the court should have done more than simply 
reaffirm existing claim construction principles.  As the forgoing 
discussion indicates, the Federal Circuit must adopt a specific and 
detailed rubric of rules for claim construction regarding not only the 
importance of each type of evidence, but also the order in which the 
judge should apply each category of evidence to the disputed terms.  The 
Federal Circuit judges must agree to apply these adopted rules 
consistently and with uniformity in their own panel decisions.  They 
should address their differences on the fact/law divergence and standard 
of review separately from the construction of the disputed claim terms.271  
Unless, and until, there is certainty from the outset, there will rarely be 
accuracy in the end. 
 
                                                                                                                                  
claim construction on a case-by-case basis). 
 270. The Federal Circuit heard 112 patent appeals in 2005.  SUNG & SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, 
§ 14:4.  Whereas according to the United States Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO), 409,532 
patent applications were filed, and 165,485 were issued in 2005.  U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005 (2005), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2005/2005annualreport.pdf. 
 271. This may be wishful thinking considering the Federal Circuit judges seem more interested 
in being “right” with regard to standard of review and issues of fact/matters of law, than following 
precedent. 
